August 13, 2026:
Russian entrepreneur Mikhail Kokorich founded Russia’s first non-government space company and is now designing inexpensive long-range drones for Ukraine. Kokorich founded Destinus, a manufacturing firm based in the Netherlands. Initially, Destinus built high-performance airplanes and propulsion systems. That changed after Ukraine was invaded. Kokorich renounced his Russian citizenship and turned to developing hypersonic drones with satellite-free navigation systems, as well as facilities to produce key components for his missiles and drones. At the same time, Destinus has produced thousands of its long-range drones and Ruta Block 1 mini cruise missiles for Ukraine. In addition, the Ruta Block 2 missile
, with a range of over 700 kilometers, will enter
production by the end of the year.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is developing a replacement for the American Patriot air defense system, the FP-7.x, that is cheaper, at $700,000, just as effective, and safer to use because Patriot radars, since their inception 44 years ago, have inadvertently broadcast their location to listening enemies. Each FP-7.x costs less than a fifth of the price of a Patriot PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile interceptor. FP-7.x also requires fewer personnel to maintain and operate a battery. For example, a Patriot battery is manned by about 100 troops, and each battery contains a radar and four launchers. A battery can fire two types of Patriot missiles. The more expensive $3.8 million PAC-3 missile is smaller than the PAC-2 anti-aircraft version. Thus, a Patriot launcher can hold sixteen PAC-3 missiles, versus four PAC-2s. A PAC-2 missile weighs about a ton; a PAC-3 weighs about a third of that. The anti-missile PAC-3 has a range of 20 kilometers, compared to 160 kilometers for the PAC-2 anti-aircraft version, which is used against low-flying drones. Given this long range, one Patriot PAC-2 anti-aircraft battery can cover more than 200 kilometers of land and coastal borders. Patriot can also take down cruise missiles, giving users some protection against just about everything the enemy can throw at them.
After nearly five years of war in Ukraine, both sides are relying on cheap, unmanned drones to replace most artillery and aircraft-delivered bombs and missiles. Drones are doing most of the reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as confirming the accuracy of aerial attacks and the enemy's current location. The latest Ukrainian innovation is a line of long-range drones capable of striking targets over 2,000 kilometers away. Using GPS/INS navigation and jam-resistant terminal pattern-recognition guidance, these drones have proved to be formidable aerial weapons. Recently, Ukraine began using longer-range attack drones to hit targets in and around Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Smolensk, and the nearby Crimean Peninsula. Russian air defenses shoot down many of these drones, but there are so many inexpensive drones being used that some get through and cause significant damage. When these exploding targets are within sight of a major city, it is difficult for Russian propagandists to claim nothing happened and all the Ukrainian drones were shot down. While the attacks on Moscow, St Petersburg and other large cities made Russian civilians aware of the war they were losing, they became even more aware when Ukraine destroyed several Wildberries warehouses. This is the Russian equivalent of Amazon, and Russians felt this loss very personally.
At the start of the war, Ukraine soon developed longer-range drones. Russia was playing catch-up. By early 2023, it was obvious that drones were dominating the battlefield in Ukraine. In July 2024, a senior Ukrainian defense official once more confirmed this and observed that the dominance of drones in combat was increasing. Since the war began in early 2022, drone use has increased at the expense of traditional artillery. The reasons are obvious. Drones are more flexible, cheaper, and come in many different models. Drones can be controlled by nearby operators and sent after targets over a thousand kilometers distant using GPS guidance and several backup systems if electronic jamming of GPS signals is encountered.
This drone revolution was made possible by increasingly inexpensive, more powerful electronics, as well as a highly developed amateur remotely controlled aircraft hobby. China dominated the consumer drone market, selling over a million of its Mavic quadcopters between 2021 and 2023. Hobby firms worldwide sold quadcopter and other drone parts so enthusiasts could build their own. A lot of those enthusiasts were Ukrainian and, when Russia invaded in early 2022, the many Ukrainian drone users, modifiers, builders and commercial manufacturers all got to work to defend the motherland.
Drones soon became the weapon of choice because, soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, both sides quickly lost most of their conventional offensive weapons in combat. These losses included armored vehicles, especially Russian tanks. Longer-range weapons, like artillery, which delivered most of its firepower to targets 30 kilometers distant, and a smaller number of guided missiles, which could reach targets over a hundred kilometers distant, tended to survive the heavy losses suffered by armored vehicles that fought at close range. The Ukrainians quickly ran out of artillery ammunition and were the first to adopt drones because they had to. The Russians are still trying to catch up.
The Russians lost most of their tube artillery in 2023-2024 by burning out their irreplaceable tube liners. By the second half of 2023, both sides had turned to drones, which were cheaper, easier to obtain, and provided more flexible alternatives. It was soon discovered that drones had seemingly endless new capabilities. One of the more crucial qualities was the ease of obtaining drones and modifying them or building larger or smaller versions. The technology required for current drone warfare has evolved over the last few decades as commercial quadcopters and hobbyist fixed-wing remotely controlled aircraft have achieved greater design and reliability maturity. This made it possible for users or developers to confidently and quickly modify existing drones to meet their needs.
Most of the resulting drones were short-range models operating no farther than ten kilometers from their user. Currently, this is over 40 kilometers. This made the combat zone much more dangerous than it had ever been. The surveillance was constant and round the clock. More expensive drones with night-vision sensors, usually based on a combination of object and heat detection and interpretation, provided adequate surveillance at night or in fog or misty conditions. Then there are logistical considerations. Reusable drones have to be recharged or refueled between missions. Drones built as single-use weapons must be checked out before use. This is especially true for the long-range attack models. These fixed-wing drones target targets a thousand kilometers or more away and tend to use a single diesel- or gasoline-powered engine. These engines must be sturdy and reliable because everything depends on a reliable propulsion system. Another critical component is the navigation and target acquisition system. Resistance to electronic jamming is essential. Electronic jamming technology constantly evolves to counter improved guidance systems, rendering earlier jammers ineffective or less effective. This makes every new drone design likely to be compromised and obsolete in short order. With the inexpensive technology drones use, rapid evolution is easier to achieve, and the ability to quickly develop ways to disrupt new tech is essential.
A major limitation is the need for trained drone operators. They require many hours of training before they can start operating these drones, and a few dozen more hours of actual use before they can make the most of the system. These drones are difficult to shoot down until they get close to the ground, and the shooter is within a few hundred meters, making it possible to target a drone with a bullet or two and bring it down. Troops are rarely in position to do this, so most of these drones can complete their mission, whether it is a one-way attack or a reconnaissance and surveillance mission. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line to a depth of at least a few kilometers into enemy territory. The Ukrainians penetrate farther – they often have effective drone coverage 20 kilometers into Russian-held territory. This makes it extremely difficult for the Russians to supply their front-line troops, even with drinking water.
This massive use of FPV (First Person View) armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine, and both sides are producing as many as they can. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in design and use, becoming more effective and essential.
Ukraine has created a new branch of its military, the Drone Force. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force that consists of manned aircraft. The Drone Force does not control the drones Ukrainian forces use regularly, but it does contribute to developing new drone models and organizing mass production of those that are successful. Drones have been an unexpected development that has had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable.
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap quadcopter drones, at about $500 each, controlled by soldiers a kilometer or more away, using FPV goggles to see what the drone's day/night video camera could see. Adding night vision at least doubles the cost for each drone, so not all of them have that capability. Each of these drones carries half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly become a flying bomb that strikes a target and detonates. This is an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power than the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed-wing drones are used for long-range operations, often over a thousand kilometers, against targets deep inside Russia.